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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal, we review an order of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying 
a motion to intervene filed by the Little Sisters of the Poor 
Saints Peter and Paul Home. The Little Sisters sought to 
intervene in litigation challenging regulations promulgated 
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The 
District Court denied the motion, finding that the Little Sisters 
lacked a significantly protectable interest in the case and that 
their interests were adequately represented by the federal 
government. We will reverse. 
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I 
 The Little Sisters of the Poor are an international Roman 
Catholic congregation whose mission is to serve the elderly 
poor of all backgrounds. They operate more than 25 homes for 
the elderly in the United States, all of which adhere to the same 
religious beliefs. Each home is separately incorporated as a 
nonprofit but is “operated under the control” of the larger 
congregation. App. 82.  
 Appellant in this case is a religious nonprofit 
corporation that operates a Little Sisters home in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. The Little Sisters’ interest in regulations 
implementing the Affordable Care Act is neither novel nor 
isolated. Indeed, they have been involved in litigation 
regarding the Affordable Care Act for years, and their attempt 
to intervene in this case must be considered in full context. 
Accordingly, we begin by describing the relevant portions of 
the Affordable Care Act and its regulatory scheme, along with 
the pertinent legal challenges filed by the Little Sisters and 
others.  
A 
 The Affordable Care Act includes a provision that 
requires health plans to cover certain forms of preventive care 
for women without cost sharing, as specified in guidelines 
issued by an agency of the United States Department of Health 
& Human Services (HHS) called the Health Resources and 
Services Administration. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). 
Preventive care under these guidelines includes: all 
contraceptive methods approved by the Food & Drug 
Administration, sterilization procedures, and related 
counseling and education. Unless an exemption applies, failure 
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to comply with the mandate renders a noncompliant employer 
subject to a penalty of $100 “for each day in the noncompliance 
period with respect to each individual to whom such failure 
relates.” 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1). In common parlance, this 
coverage has come to be known as the “contraceptive 
mandate.” 
 In 2011, HHS, along with the United States 
Departments of Labor and Treasury (collectively, the 
Departments) promulgated interim final regulations exempting 
certain religious employers from the contraceptive mandate. 76 
Fed. Reg. 46,621 (Aug. 3, 2011). To be eligible, a religious 
employer had to (1) have the inculcation of religious values as 
its purpose; (2) primarily employ people who share its religious 
tenets; (3) primarily provide services to persons who share its 
religious tenets; and (4) be a church, its integrated auxiliary, a 
convention or association of a church, or “the exclusively 
religious activities of any religious order.” Id. at 46,623; see 
also 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii). 
 Almost two years after the interim final regulations 
were promulgated, the Departments issued a final rule in 
response to public input and various legal challenges. 78 Fed. 
Reg. 39,870 (July 2, 2013). That final rule altered the definition 
of an eligible religious employer by dropping the first three 
requirements, id. at 39,874, and it also provided an 
accommodation process for religious nonprofit organizations 
that did not meet this new definition. Such a religious nonprofit 
employer could avail itself of the accommodation if it (1) had 
religious objections to providing coverage for some or all of 
the required contraceptive services; (2) was “organized and 
operate[d] as a nonprofit entity;” (3) “[held] itself out as a 
religious organization;” and (4) “self-certifie[d] that it 
satisfie[d] the first three criteria.” Id. Once an employer made 
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this self-certification to its insurer or third-party administrator, 
that entity would provide the mandated contraceptive services 
directly to women covered under the employer’s plan. Id. at 
39,875. Later, the Departments issued another rule that allowed 
entities eligible for the accommodation to directly notify HHS 
of a religious objection. 80 Fed. Reg. 41,318, 41,323 (July 14, 
2015).1 Through these two regulations, the self-certification 
accommodation sought to ensure that qualifying employers did 
not need to “contract, arrange, pay, or refer for contraceptive 
coverage,” but their “plan participants and 
beneficiaries . . . [would] still benefit from separate payments 
for contraceptive services without cost sharing or other 
charge,” as required by law. 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874. 
B 
 Two months after the final rule was issued in 2013, the 
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colorado 
and the Little Sisters of the Poor, Baltimore, Inc. filed suit in 
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. 
They claimed the contraceptive mandate was unconstitutional 
and that it violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See 
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 6 F. 
Supp. 3d 1225, 1232–33 (D. Colo. 2013). With respect to 
RFRA, the Little Sisters asserted that the self-certification 
accommodation would force them to “take actions that directly 
cause others to provide contraception or appear to participate 
                                              
 1 In response to Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), the Departments also issued rules 
extending the accommodation to closely held for-profit entities 
with religious objections to providing contraceptive coverage. 
80 Fed. Reg. 41,318, 41,324 (July 14, 2015). 
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in the Departments’ delivery scheme,” both of which would 
violate their religious conviction “that deliberately avoiding 
reproduction through medical means is immoral.” Little Sisters 
of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 
1167–68 (10th Cir. 2015). They sought a preliminary 
injunction, which the district court denied. The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed, holding that the regulations did not violate RFRA 
because they did not substantially burden religious exercise. Id. 
at 1205. 
 The Little Sisters sought certiorari, and the Supreme 
Court granted review in order to decide whether the self-
certification accommodation violated RFRA. In addition to the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision, the Court also granted certiorari to 
review decisions of the Third, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits, which 
were consolidated as Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) 
(per curiam).   
In Zubik, the Court did not answer the question 
“whether petitioners’ religious exercise ha[d] been 
substantially burdened.” Id. at 1560. Instead, it explained that 
both the petitioners and the government had “confirm[ed]” that 
“contraceptive coverage could be provided to petitioners’ 
employees, through petitioners’ insurance companies, without 
any . . . notice from petitioners.” Id. at 1559–60. It then 
vacated the underlying judgments and remanded the cases, 
directing the parties to attempt “to arrive at an approach going 
forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise 
while at the same time ensuring that women covered by 
petitioners’ health plans receive full and equal health coverage, 
including contraceptive coverage.” Id. at 1560 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court found its 
instruction appropriate in light of “the substantial clarification 
and refinement in the positions of the parties” over the course 
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of the litigation. Id. Finally, it “anticipate[d] that the Courts of 
Appeals [would] allow the parties sufficient time to resolve any 
outstanding issues between them,” id., and it noted that the 
litigation sufficed to give the government notice of the 
petitioners’ objections, such that “the Government may not 
impose taxes or penalties on petitioners for failure to provide 
the relevant notice,” id. at 1561. 
C 
 Two months after Zubik was decided, the Departments 
issued a request for information on “alternative ways . . . to 
obtain an accommodation, while still ensuring that women 
enrolled in the organizations’ health plans have access to 
seamless coverage of the full range of . . . approved 
contraceptives without cost sharing.” 81 Fed. Reg. 47,741, 
47,741 (July 22, 2016). Six months later, the Departments 
concluded that no such “feasible approach” existed “at this 
time.” DEP’T OF LABOR, FAQs About Affordable Care Act 
Implementation Part 36 at 4 (Jan. 9, 2017), available at 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-
activities/resource-center/faqs/aca-part-36.pdf. 
 In May 2017, President Trump issued an executive 
order that directed the Departments to “consider issuing 
amended regulations, consistent with applicable law, to 
address conscience-based objections to the preventive-care 
mandate.” Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,675, 
21,675 (May 4, 2017). In response, the Departments issued two 
interim final rules (IFRs), one providing for a “religious 
exemption” and the other providing for a “moral exemption.” 
Most relevant to this appeal, the “religious exemption” IFR 
applies to “entities, and individuals, with sincerely held 
religious beliefs objecting to contraceptive or sterilization 
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coverage,” including “for-profit entities that are not closely-
held.” 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792, 47,808, 47,810 (Oct. 13, 2017). It 
also eliminates the need for exempt entities to comply with the 
self-certification accommodation and imposes no new notice 
requirements upon them. Id. at 47,808. The “moral exemption” 
IFR allows closely held nonprofit and for-profit entities to 
claim an exemption based on sincerely held moral beliefs. 82 
Fed. Reg. 47,838, 47,849–52 (Oct. 13, 2017). 
 Five days after the IFRs were promulgated, the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed a civil action in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, alleging that the IFRs violate the Equal 
Protection and Establishment Clauses of the Constitution, Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 
and procedural and substantive provisions of the APA. 
Pennsylvania sought a declaratory judgment that both IFRs 
were unlawful, as well as preliminary and permanent 
injunctive relief. It claimed that the religious exemption IFR 
allows employers to opt out of providing no-cost contraceptive 
coverage, resulting in employees losing the preventive care 
mandated by the Affordable Care Act.  
The Little Sisters moved to intervene either as of right 
under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or 
alternatively for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). The 
District Court denied the motion. It found intervention under 
Rule 24(a) inappropriate after concluding that the Little Sisters 
did not have a significantly protectable interest in the litigation 
and that their interests were adequately represented by the 
federal government. And it determined that intervention under 
Rule 24(b) would delay the litigation and “prejudice the 
interest of the parties in securing an efficient resolution” of the 
case. Pennsylvania v. Trump, 2017 WL 6206133, at *5 (E.D. 
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Pa. Dec. 8, 2017). The Little Sisters appealed, and a week later 
the District Court issued an opinion and order granting 
Pennsylvania’s request for preliminary injunctive relief. The 
federal government appealed the order granting the 
preliminary injunction, and this Court stayed that case pending 
the outcome of our decision in this appeal. 
II2 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. “[W]e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
because the denial of a motion to intervene as of right is a final, 
appealable order.” Dev. Fin. Corp. v. Alpha Hous. & Health 
Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 1995). We will overturn 
a district court’s order denying a motion to intervene as of right 
only “if the court has abused its discretion by applying an 
improper legal standard or [by] reaching a conclusion we are 
confident is incorrect.” Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 
964, 969 (3d Cir. 1998). We also review orders denying 
motions to intervene under Rule 24(b) for abuse of discretion, 
but “[w]e are more reluctant to intrude” into these “highly 
discretionary” decisions. Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 
F.2d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1992). 
                                              
 2 Because the Little Sisters moved to intervene as 
defendants and seek the same relief as the federal government, 
they need not demonstrate Article III standing. See Town of 
Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017); 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003) 
(assuming standing where original defendant had standing and 
intervenor-defendant sought same relief as that sought by 
defendant), overruled on other grounds, Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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III 
 A party that has filed a timely motion has a right to 
intervene under Rule 24(a) if it can show three things: (1) a 
sufficient interest in the litigation; (2) “a threat that the interest 
will be impaired or affected, as a practical matter, by the 
disposition of the action”; and (3) that its interest is not 
adequately represented by the existing parties to the litigation. 
Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 969. Since there is no dispute that the 
Little Sisters’ motion was timely, we consider these three 
elements in turn. 
A 
 Did the Little Sisters demonstrate a sufficient interest in 
the litigation? To meet this prong, the Supreme Court has held 
that an applicant must assert an interest that is “significantly 
protectable.” Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 
(1971). We have interpreted this to mean “a cognizable legal 
interest, and not simply an interest of a general and indefinite 
character.” Brody, 957 F.2d at 1116 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). An applicant must therefore demonstrate 
that its interest is “specific to [it], is capable of definition, and 
will be directly affected in a substantially concrete fashion by 
the relief sought.” Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 972. Given these 
standards, it is not surprising that “[t]he facts assume 
overwhelming importance in each decision.” Id. 
 The Little Sisters seek to intervene to defend only the 
portions of the religious exemption IFR that apply to them. See 
Benjamin ex rel. Yock v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 701 F.3d 938, 
951 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that a “proposed intervenor[] need 
not possess an interest in each and every aspect of the 
litigation” and “[is] entitled to intervene as to specific issues so 
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long as their interest in those issues is significantly protectable” 
(citation omitted)). In their motion, the Little Sisters argued 
that the civil action brought by the Commonwealth would harm 
them by narrowing or eliminating the protection conferred by 
the Supreme Court in Zubik and by invalidating the regulatory 
protection afforded to them under the IFR. If those things come 
to pass, the Little Sisters claim, they will be “forced to choose 
between violating their faith and paying crippling fines.” ECF 
19-1 at 12 (Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. to Intervene). 
 Contrary to the District Court’s decision, we agree with 
the Little Sisters that their interest in preserving the religious 
exemption is concrete and capable of definition. We also agree 
that the relationships among the various homes run by the 
Little Sisters of the Poor Congregation, including the two 
entities that were parties in Zubik, confirm that the Little Sisters 
have a unique interest compared to other religious objectors 
who might wish to intervene. We therefore conclude that those 
interests are significantly protectable. 
First, the Little Sisters have a significantly protectable 
interest in the continued protection afforded by Zubik. This 
litigation has the potential to reopen issues that turn on the 
meaning of RFRA as it bears on self-certification, potentially 
influencing any substantive outcome. The Commonwealth’s 
APA challenge calls into question whether the new religious 
exemption is required by RFRA and therefore justifies 
bypassing notice-and-comment rulemaking to issue the IFRs 
quickly. If this Court were to reach the RFRA issue, we would 
be answering the very question the Supreme Court chose not 
to address in Zubik, i.e., whether the self-certification process 
imposes a substantial burden on the Little Sisters’ sincerely 
held religious beliefs. Answering that question in the negative 
surely would impair the protection conferred by Zubik. 
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Second, the Little Sisters have a significantly 
protectable interest in the religious exemption IFR, since it 
constitutes the very “approach” contemplated by Zubik. 82 
Fed. Reg. at 47,814 (“These [IFRs] provide a specific policy 
resolution that courts have been waiting to receive from the 
Departments for more than a year.”). The Little Sisters have 
litigated for the protection conferred by the religious 
exemption IFR for five years, and the IFR describes the Little 
Sisters as one impetus for change. Id. at 47,798. It stands to 
reason, then, that the Little Sisters have a significantly 
protectable interest in whether the approach contemplated by 
Zubik, as manifested in the religious exemption IFR, ultimately 
prevails. 
We faced an analogous scenario in Kleissler, where one 
of the timber companies had won a bid for a contract, and the 
bid was threatened by an environmental suit against the 
municipality. 157 F.3d at 973. We granted intervention as of 
right, reasoning that the accepted bid, while not a contract, 
amounted to a protectable legal interest. Id. The same logic 
applies here. 
For all of these reasons, the Little Sisters have 
demonstrated that this litigation implicates their legally 
cognizable interests relating to both the religious exemption 
IFR and Zubik. We are confident the District Court erred in 
holding otherwise. 
B 
 Having concluded that the Little Sisters have a 
sufficient interest in the litigation, we now consider whether 
that interest “is in jeopardy in the lawsuit.” Brody, 957 F.2d at 
1122. To meet this requirement, an applicant “must 
14 
 
demonstrate that [its] legal interests may be affected or 
impaired[] as a practical matter by the disposition of the 
action.” Id. (citation omitted). However, “[i]t is not sufficient 
that the claim be incidentally affected; rather, there must be a 
tangible threat to the applicant's legal interest.” Id. at 1123 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because our 
focus is on the “practical consequences” of the litigation, we 
“may consider any significant legal effect on the applicant’s 
interest,” including a decision’s stare decisis effect or a 
proposed remedy’s impact on the applicant for intervention. Id. 
at 1122–23 (citation omitted). We have also stated a “policy 
preference which, as a matter of judicial economy, favors 
intervention over subsequent collateral attacks.” Kleissler, 157 
F.3d at 970 (citation omitted). 
 Thus, we must determine whether the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania’s civil action poses a tangible threat to the 
Little Sisters’ interests. In arguing that no threat exists, the 
Commonwealth claims that the injunctive and declaratory 
relief it seeks will simply preserve the status quo, under which 
Zubik “fully protect[s]” the Little Sisters from the imposition 
of fines. Commonwealth Br. 19. To support this argument, 
Pennsylvania emphasizes that the Little Sisters have not lost 
their protection under Zubik in the months since the District 
Court granted preliminary injunctive relief, so “no outcome in 
this case presents a ‘tangible threat’ to the Little Sisters’ 
‘legally cognizable’ interests.” Id. 
 We disagree with this view, which the District Court 
adopted, and we conclude that the Commonwealth’s 
contentions are based on an incomplete reading of Zubik. Far 
from providing permanent protection, Zubik afforded the 
parties merely “an opportunity” to arrive at a suitable 
compromise. 136 S. Ct. at 1560. Furthermore, the Supreme 
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Court instructed the courts of appeals to provide the parties 
with “sufficient time” to settle their differences. Id. But what if 
the parties are unable to settle their differences within what the 
courts of appeals deem “sufficient time”? In that event, the 
appellate courts will have no choice but to revisit the merits of 
the RFRA questions in light of the parties’ “significantly 
clarified” views. See id. 
 As the religious exemption IFR indicates, one court of 
appeals was close to reaching that point a year ago. In March 
of 2017, the Seventh Circuit requested “a report of an 
agreement to resolve the case or detailed reports on the parties’ 
respective positions.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,814 (quoting ECF 
130, Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 
2014) (No. 13-3853)).3 Absent such an agreement by May 1, 
2017, the Seventh Circuit “plan[ned] to schedule oral argument 
on the merits of the case on short notice.” Id. The Departments 
subsequently notified the court of the impending rulemaking. 
Id. Though that case was later voluntarily dismissed, the 
Seventh Circuit’s order makes clear that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Zubik lacks the kind of permanency ascribed to it 
by the Commonwealth here. Should the federal government 
have to engage in a new rulemaking process, there is no 
guarantee that the Little Sisters will remain protected under 
Zubik. In this regard, the District Court found that the Little 
Sisters have recourse through the litigation brought in the 
Tenth Circuit by their colleagues. However, “[a]n applicant 
need not . . . prove that [it] would be barred from bringing a 
                                              
 3 The Supreme Court had previously granted certiorari 
and vacated the judgment in that case in light of Zubik. See 
Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016). 
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later action or that intervention constitutes the only possible 
avenue of relief.” Brody, 957 F.2d at 1123. 
And, as already discussed, the pending litigation poses 
a tangible threat to the Little Sisters’ regulatory protection 
because it has the potential to declare that exemptions from the 
self-certification accommodation are not required by RFRA. 
Such a determination could affect how the government 
proceeds in future rulemakings, including whether it provides 
alternatives to the self-certification accommodation. This, in 
turn, could affect whether the Little Sisters will remain exempt 
from the mandate. Accordingly, we conclude that the Little 
Sisters have demonstrated that they may be “practically 
disadvantaged by the disposition of the action.” Benjamin, 701 
F.3d at 951 (citation omitted). They therefore meet the 
impairment requirement. 
C 
 Finally, we evaluate whether the Little Sisters have 
established that their interests are not adequately represented 
by the federal government. We have held that an applicant’s 
interests are not adequately represented if they diverge 
sufficiently from the interests of the existing party, such that 
“the existing party cannot devote proper attention to the 
applicant’s interests.” United States v. Territory of the Virgin 
Islands, 748 F.3d 514, 520 (3d Cir. 2014). This burden is 
generally “treated as minimal” and requires the applicant to 
show “that representation of his interest ‘may be’ inadequate.” 
Mountain Top Condo. Ass’n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, 
Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 
528, 538 n.10 (1972)). 
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 Notwithstanding that minimal burden, a rebuttable 
presumption of adequacy applies “if one party is a government 
entity charged by law with representing the interests of the 
applicant for intervention.” Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d at 520 
(citation omitted). But even when the government is a party, 
“[t]he burden of establishing inadequacy of representation . . . 
varies with each case.” Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 972. For that 
reason, the presumption is particularly strong when the 
governmental and private interests “closely parallel” one 
another, id., or are “nearly identical,” Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d 
at 525. In those cases, a proposed intervenor will overcome the 
presumption only with a “compelling showing.” Id. at 520 
(quoting Mountain Top, 72 F.3d at 369). By contrast, “when an 
agency’s views are necessarily colored by its view of the public 
welfare rather than the more parochial views of a proposed 
intervenor whose interest is personal to it, the burden is 
comparatively light.” Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 972. The same 
holds true when the government is charged with serving “two 
distinct interests, which are related, but not identical.” 
Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538. 
 The parties dispute the degree of divergence between 
the interests of the Little Sisters on the one hand and those of 
the federal government on the other. The Commonwealth 
contends that the Little Sisters and the government are in 
“lockstep” because they both seek to defend the validity of the 
IFRs. Commonwealth Br. 16. In support, the Commonwealth 
relies heavily on United States v. Territory of the Virgin 
Islands, 748 F.3d at 522. In that case, we held that an inmate 
had no right to intervene in litigation brought by the United 
States to remedy prison conditions because his interests were 
“essentially identical” to those of the federal government. Id. 
The Little Sisters respond by citing our decision in Kleissler v. 
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United States Forest Service, 157 F.3d at 967, where we 
recognized the right of timber contractors, municipalities, and 
school districts to intervene in litigation brought by an 
environmental public interest group to enjoin logging activities 
in a national forest. The Little Sisters argue that here, as in 
Kleissler, the government must defend “numerous complex 
and conflicting interests,” id. at 973, including the rights of 
nonprofit and for-profit religious objectors, moral objectors, 
and women seeking access to contraceptive services. Without 
the right to intervene, the Little Sisters contend that their 
“straightforward” interests “may become lost in [this] thicket 
of sometimes inconsistent governmental policies.” Id. at 973–
74. 
 We recognize that the Little Sisters’ situation is not 
perfectly analogous to Kleissler and other cases holding that 
the government did not adequately represent a private party’s 
interests. See Benjamin, 701 F.3d at 958; Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 
973–74; Brody, 957 F.2d at 1124. Nevertheless, the unique 
position in which Zubik has placed the federal government 
renders this case sufficiently similar to those decisions for us 
to conclude that the Little Sisters carry a “comparatively light” 
burden here and have overcome the presumption. See 
Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 972. First, the Little Sisters’ situation is 
similar to Trbovich, where a statute obligated the Secretary of 
Labor to uphold the “related[] but not identical” interests in 
enforcing the rights of union members against their union as 
well as the “public interest” in assuring free and democratic 
union elections. 404 U.S. at 538–39. Zubik likewise tasked the 
government with serving two related interests that are not 
identical: accommodating the free exercise rights of religious 
objectors while protecting the broader public interest in access 
to contraceptive methods and services. And like Benjamin, the 
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Zubik compromise must balance the rights of “two groups with 
quite divergent desires and interests.” 701 F.3d at 958. Finally, 
as in Kleissler, the government must defend “numerous 
complex and conflicting interests.” 157 F.3d at 973. The 
religious exemption IFR applies not only to religious nonprofit 
corporations like the Little Sisters, but also to closely held and 
publicly traded for-profit corporations. And the moral 
exemption IFR protects parties for reasons unrelated to 
religion. The religious and moral interests of these entities are 
numerous and varied. Accordingly, there is no guarantee that 
the government will sufficiently attend to the Little Sisters’ 
specific interests as it attempts to uphold both IFRs in their 
entirety. See Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 967 (concluding that the 
proposed intervenors had carried their burden by showing “a 
reasonable doubt whether the government agency would 
adequately represent [their] concerns”). 
 The preceding discussion also demonstrates why our 
decision in Virgin Islands is inapposite. We determined there 
that the interests of the putative intervenor and the government 
were “essentially identical,” 748 F.3d at 522, but for reasons 
that do not apply here. First, the inmate in that case 
“extensively quote[d]” from the government’s pleadings, id. at 
521, which the Little Sisters have not done. Second, the United 
States sought to remedy several allegedly unconstitutional 
prison conditions, id. at 518, which meant that the inmate who 
moved to intervene was one of “the exact constituents” the 
government attempted to protect, and both parties shared the 
same interest in ensuring that any remedy was “strictly 
enforced,” id. at 523. Unlike that situation, here the IFRs 
protect more than religious nonprofits like the Little Sisters, 
and the Little Sisters do not share the government’s interest in 
upholding every aspect of both IFRs. Accordingly, with an eye 
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toward the “elasticity” and “flexibility” that Rule 24 
contemplates, Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 970, 971, and cognizant of 
the highly fact-bound nature of requests to intervene under 
Rule 24(a), we conclude that the Little Sisters’ interests may 
not be adequately represented by the federal government.4 
Therefore, we must reject the District Court’s contrary holding, 
which improperly applied our precedent. 
IV 
 For the reasons stated, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order denying the Little Sisters’ motion to intervene 
under Rule 24(a), and we will remand the case to permit 
intervention for the purpose of defending the portions of the 
religious exemption IFR that apply to religious nonprofit 
entities. 
                                              
 4 Because we hold that the Little Sisters meet the 
requirements to intervene as of right, we need not review the 
District Court’s ruling regarding permissive intervention. 
